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This paper develops an efficiency theory of contingent trade policies. We model the 
competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing 
game under incomplete information about production costs. The cost distributions are 
asymmetric because the foreign firm has to pay a trade cost. We show that the foreign firm 
prices more aggressively to overcome its cost disadvantage. The resulting possibility of an 
inefficient allocation justifies the use of contingent trade policy on efficiency grounds. 
Contingent trade policy that seeks to maximize global welfare can avoid the potential 
inefficiency. National governments, on the other hand, make excessive use of contingent trade 
policy due to rent shifting motives. The expected inefficiency of national policy is larger 
(smaller) for low (high) trade costs compared to the laissez-faire case. In general, there is no 
clear ranking between the laissez-faire outcome and a contingent national trade policy. 
JEL-Code: F120, F130. 





Department of Economics 
University of California 
USA – Santa Cruz CA 95064 
mccalman@ucsc.edu 
Frank Stähler 
Department of Economics 
University of Würzburg 
Sanderring 2 




Department of Economics 
Catholic University of Leuven 
Naamsestraat 69 






Paper presented at several conferences and seminars. We thank Nic Schmitt and participants 
for helpful comments and suggestions. 1 Introduction
Contingent protection occupies an interesting niche within the trade policy literature; if
certain pre-speciﬁed criteria are met, which can be substantiated through quasi-judicial
process, then a country feels entitled to impose a trade barrier. Classifying policies from
this procedural perspective implies that contingent protection covers a range of policies
such as anti-dumping (AD), countervailing duties (CVD) and safeguards/escape clause
actions. While the motivation and application of these policies varies, the pre-determined
criteria for their use lends an air of legitimacy to their implementation.1 However, regardless
of the apparent legitimacy aﬀorded by an inquisitional methodology, these policies tend
to be criticized due to their excessive use which stems from the malleable nature of the
criteria employed. In short, while there may exist some criteria which justify a policy
intervention (i.e. some market failure), government failure tends to oﬀset any potential
beneﬁts.2 However, it is not immediately obvious that this outcome is always guaranteed.
Hence the objective of this paper is to distinguish the circumstances under which policy
action may potentially be eﬀective from those when it will not.
To explore the issues associated with this question we construct a simple framework that
allows for both market and — potentially — government failure. The setting we choose to
focus on resembles a dumping style model. Our point of departure is to move the rationale
for policy intervention away from the usual motivation of predation toward a broader and
more relevant concept of allocative eﬃciency.3 Therefore we focus on the question of who
should be producing what and whether trade policy, in the form of duties, has a role to
play in improving eﬃciency. If a policy-maker has complete information about the relevant
1The original motivation for AD policy is based in the logic of predation, while CVD is motivated by
“unfair” foreign policies. In contrast, the use of safeguards has been justiﬁed on the basis of maintaining
suﬃcient ﬂexibility to ensure the continued adherence to a trade agreement (see Bagwell and Staiger
(1990)). Alternatively, contingent trade policy can be regarded as the remains of a gradual reduction of
trade barriers; see Chisik (2003) for model of gradualism in free trade agreements.
2For instance AD duties are often seen as gratuitous in size - with duties of the order of 100% not
unusual, see Bown (2007).
3Our focus on price discrimination is reminiscent of Brander and Krugman (1983). However, while
dumping occurs in their framework, it is not the focus of their analysis. As discussed below, we adopt a
market structure that emphasizes the resource allocation issues and provides a clear policy benchmark.
1costs, then determining the optimal allocation of resources is straightforward and the only
real concern is one of policy failure. This is the element - policy failure - that the previous
literature has focused on and sought to stress. If the policy-maker is incompletely informed
about the cost structure, then both the mechanics of competition become more involved
and the criteria for determining government intervention becomes less transparent. In this
setting it is possible to have a market failure that cannot be adequately addressed by
government intervention. It is this environment of asymmetric information in which we
couch our analysis.4
More speciﬁcally, we develop a model of international competition where neither ﬁrm is
reliably informed of the other’s cost structure.5 To sharpen the implications of competition,
we assume that ﬁrms produce a homogeneous product and compete in prices; generating
a winner-take-all scenario. Under complete information this set-up achieves allocative ef-
ﬁciency. Allocative eﬃciency is also achieved under the assumption of symmetry when
ﬁrms are incompletely informed (that is, both ﬁrms are assumed to take cost draws from
the same probability distribution). The virtue of this set-up is that under either complete
information or asymmetric information there is no market failure and therefore no need
for government intervention. This provides us with a clear and unambiguous benchmark.
However, as a model of international competition it is lacking a critical feature: transport
costs. The introduction of transport costs implies that the ﬁrms are no longer symmetric.
This small, but realistic change has profound implications for the allocation of resources:
the higher cost ﬁrm can ultimately be the sole supplier in the market. This market failure
has a clear source; since the foreign ﬁrm is at a disadvantage due to transport costs it prices
more aggressively than the domestic ﬁrm. Consequently, when both ﬁrms have the same
cost draws (inclusive of transport costs in case of the foreign ﬁrm), the foreign ﬁrm will
quote a strictly lower price. This implies two things. First, in the neighborhood of these
cost draws it is possible to identify outcomes where the higher cost foreign ﬁrm serves the
4A policy process distorted by political inﬂuence can also result in government failure. In this paper
we abstract from this consideration and focus on the issue of whether or not a domestic government can
intervene in an eﬃciency enhancing manner.
5For empirical evidence of ﬁrms operating in a stochastic environment, see Hillberry and McCalman
(2011).
2domestic market; an ineﬃcient allocation of resources. Moreover, this ineﬃciency can be
very pronounced, representing up to 15% of ex ante surplus. Second, the foreign ﬁrm prices
more aggressively abroad than in their local market, i.e. dumping occurs.6
Given such market failure, the question we address in this paper is whether the use
of contingent trade policy can remedy the ineﬃciency and achieve an eﬃcient allocation
of resources.7 One important obstacle the policymaker faces is that production costs are
private information. Can a government infer which ﬁrm is the lower cost producer for any
given set of cost draws from the ﬁrms’ pricing behavior? And if the answer is positive,
does the announcement of a mechanism for intervention still enable such an inference to
be drawn? 8 We show that it is possible for a government to infer the costs in the absence
of policy, and also to design a contingent trade policy scheme that preserves this inferential
ability; that is, a ﬁrst best outcome can potentially be achieved.
The ability to achieve the ﬁrst best, however, does not imply that it will be implemented.
We consider ﬁrst the case of a global institution seeking to maximize global welfare. Such
an institution could implement a ﬁrst best policy. However, its distributional implications
will most likely be asymmetric, and not oﬀer unambiguous gains to both countries. Hence
such an institution might be vetoed. We study this case mainly as a benchmark. The second
and more realistic scenario is the case where it is up to national governments to implement
contingent trade policy. National policymakers, however, do not have any incentive to
implement the ﬁrst best outcome. Seeking to maximize national welfare, they exploit the
rent shifting aspect of protection and make excessive use of contingent trade policies. The
resulting equilibrium will thus again be ineﬃcient, this time because of rent shifting.
The presence of two ineﬃciencies — one stemming from market failure, the other from
6Dumped imports are typically deﬁned to be foreign products exported at prices below ”fair value,”
that is, either below the prices of comparable products for sale in the domestic market of the exporting
country or below costs of production.
7A number of other papers have considered an environment of asymmetric information: Miyagiwa and
Ohno (2007), Matschke and Schottner (2008) and Kolev and Prusa (2002). However, these papers are
concerned with the implications of anti-dumping policy on ﬁrm behavior (output, prices and proﬁts) and
do not investigate whether anti-dumping duties can achieve a ﬁrst best outcome.
8Even in a complete information setting, Staiger and Wolak (1992) and Anderson (1992) make the
point that the mere existence of anti-dumping policy will alter ﬁrms behavior.
3government failure — obviously raises the question which of them is quantitatively more
important. Our analysis shows that the allocative ineﬃciency dominates at high trade
costs. For lower trade costs, on the other hand, it is the ineﬃciency caused by rent shifting
motivated policy that is larger. At high trade costs, it is therefore preferable to allow
national governments to conduct contingent trade policy, while for low trade costs the
laissez-faire regime welfare-dominates nationally conducted policy.
This paper is not the ﬁrst paper on contingent trade policies, but there is a large and
extensive theoretical and empirical literature on anti-dumping, countervailing duties and
safeguards/escape clauses (for an overview, see for example Chapter 7 in Feenstra (2004)
and Blonigen and Prusa (2003)). We regard our paper as complementary to a newer lit-
erature whose objective is to explain the ﬂexibility of trade agreements and the existence
of contingent trade policies as a response to potential shocks.9 Our paper characterizes
the conditions under which contingent trade policies are feasible (that is, can be “success-
fully”implemented), and it oﬀers a rationale for why countries may have this discretion
rather than be bound by a ﬁxed policy. While this has a similar emphasis in the ﬂexibil-
ity literature, the innovation of our paper is that we allow for an interplay between the
policy environment and the actions of ﬁrms – that is, we allow the announcement of the
policy rule to change ﬁrm behavior. So rather than having a given degree of uncertainty
and choosing the optimal design of the institution under various constraints (that is, abil-
ity of adjudicators), we examine how the institutions themselves can either enhance or
undermine their own eﬀectiveness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we set up the model,
solve for the price functions, and show that an allocative ineﬃciency can arise. Section 3
presents the analysis of a contingent trade policy that maximizes global welfare. In Section
4, we analyze the policy a national government seeking to maximize national welfare would
enact, and compare it to the laissez-faire case. Section 5, ﬁnally, oﬀers concluding remarks.
9One strand of this literature considers contingent trade policies as an insurance against shocks which
keeps the trade agreement viable, see for example Fischer and Prusa (2003). Other papers have even
endogenized the scope of an agreement by explaining the contract incompleteness by costly contracting,
see Horn and Staiger (2010), Maggi and Staiger (2008) and Maggi and Staiger (2009). For a model with
costly state-veriﬁcation, see Beshkar and Bond (2010).
42 The model
We begin our analysis by considering a baseline setup without contingent trade policy. A
key feature of the framework presented here, driven by informational asymmetries, will be
the possibility of market failure (i.e. a misallocation of resources), while it is also possible
that the laissez-faire equilibrium allocates resources eﬃciently. Our setting features two
ﬁrms — a domestic ﬁrm and a foreign ﬁrm — which both produce a homogeneous prod-
uct for the domestic market. Consumers in this market have unit demands, a maximum
willingness to pay of one, and without further loss of generality, we normalize the size of
consumers to one. In choosing a model of homogeneous goods with inelastic demand, we
squarely place the emphasis on the location of production as being the sole determinant
of economic eﬃciency. To sharpen the resource allocation issue, let ﬁrms compete against
each other in prices. That is, consumers buy from ﬁrm i if pi < pj (and randomize in
case of equal prices). Importantly, we assume that the ﬁrms’ production costs, c1 and c2,
are private information. That is, a ﬁrm knows its own cost but does not know the cost
realization of its rival. As is standard in models such as ours, assume that the beliefs of
ﬁrm i about the production cost of its opponent, cj, are described by a cdf F(c). That
is, costs are drawn from the same distribution. Note that the asymmetry of information
alone is not enough to generate a misallocation of resources. To obtain a potential market
failure, we rely on adding the plausible feature that the foreign ﬁrm must pay a per unit
trade cost of t (which is assumed to be common knowledge).
By adding the transport cost to the model, it now has a feature that potentially induces
market failure. At the same time, adding this feature complicates the analysis since it is
possible for the foreign ﬁrm to receive a cost draw that — once the transport cost is added
— exceeds the domestic consumer’s willingness to pay. In case of such a high cost, the
foreign ﬁrm will clearly not be competitive in the domestic market, and leave the market
to the domestic ﬁrm. To deal (or rather to avoid dealing) with this case, we add a pre-stage
to our model where the foreign ﬁrm has to decide whether to enter the domestic market.
If it decides to do so, it has to pay a market-entry cost of ǫ, which can be observed by
the domestic ﬁrm. The investment required to enter the market can be relatively small,
for example the search cost of ﬁnding a wholesaler and/or retailer. Importantly, the entry
5decision of the foreign ﬁrm signals a certain productivity range, which allows the domestic
ﬁrm to update its beliefs about its opponent’s productivity. If the foreign ﬁrm does not
enter the market, the domestic ﬁrm is a monopolist and will set p1 equal to one. In what
follows, we shall focus on cases in which entry occurs.10 Table 1 summarizes the sequence
of decisions in our model, which can be solved backwards in the usual fashion.
Table 1: Game structure
Stage 0:
Both the domestic and the foreign ﬁrm draw
their marginal production costs from [0,1].
Productions costs are private information.
Stage I:
The foreign ﬁrm decides on entry which warrants
a cost of size ǫ, ǫ ≥ 0,
observable by the domestic ﬁrm.
Stage II:
If the foreign ﬁrm has entered, both ﬁrms set their prices.
If the foreign ﬁrm has not entered, the domestic ﬁrm sets its price.
Stage III:
In case of a contingent trade policy, the regulating authority
observes prices and decides whether to impose
a tariﬀ on foreign imports.
In order to solve for the equilibrium, we start from the assumption (to be veriﬁed later)
that the optimal pricing functions pi(ci) are monotone and strictly increasing in costs.
This implies that there exist inverse pricing functions that are also monotone and strictly
increasing in prices. We denote these inverse pricing functions by φi(pi), i.e. price pi is
associated with a cost ci = φi(pi). These costs are drawn from a common distribution,
characterized by the cumulative distribution function F(c). The trade cost and the entry
decision of the foreign ﬁrm imply that the (updated) beliefs over the other ﬁrm’s cost will
10The other case is trivial and not of particular interest. We should keep in mind, though, that our
analysis is conditional on entry, and that a change in t also changes the probability of entry.
6be asymmetric across ﬁrms. Let F1(c1) denote the distribution of the cost of the domestic
ﬁrm, which is identical to the underlying distribution F(c). The distribution of the cost of
the foreign ﬁrm, F2(c2), on the other hand, is based on a Bayesian update from F(c) in
line with the observation that the foreign ﬁrm enters the market.
Consider now the ﬁrms’ pricing decisions. Suppose the domestic ﬁrm sets a price of p1,
and the foreign ﬁrm employs the inverse pricing function φ2(p2). The probability that the
domestic ﬁrm loses the market in the Bertrand pricing game is equal to F2(φ2(p1)), which
captures the probability that the foreign ﬁrm has a cost below the threshold value that is
implied by applying its inverse pricing function to the price p1. In this case, the domestic
ﬁrm’s proﬁt is zero as it is undercut by the foreign ﬁrm. The domestic ﬁrm wins only if
p1 < p2, that is, its chances of winning are equal to 1 − F2(φ2(p1)). A similar argument
applies to the foreign ﬁrm. Hence we can write the expected proﬁts of both ﬁrms as follows:
π1(p1;c1) = (1 − F2(φ2(p1)))(p1 − c1), (1)
π2(p2;c2) = (1 − F1(φ1(p2)))(p2 − c2 − t), (2)
where the ﬁrst term in each expression on the RHS is the probability of winning the market,
and the second factor is the proﬁt margin. Note that the foreign ﬁrm has an extra cost of
t to deduct from it margin.
Each ﬁrm chooses its price in order to maximize expected proﬁt. The resulting ﬁrst-
order conditions for interior solutions are given by:
(1 − F2(φ2(p1))) − f2(φ2(p1))φ
′
2(p1)(p1 − c1) = 0, (3)
(1 − F1(φ1(p2))) − f1(φ1(p2))φ
′
1(p2)(p2 − c2 − t) = 0, (4)
where fi(ci) = F ′
i(ci) denotes the density function corresponding to Fi(ci).
In order to make the model tractable, we make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 Costs are distributed uniformly over the unit interval, i.e. F(c) = c.
Assumption 1 will allow us to ﬁnd closed form solutions for the optimal pricing functions.
Furthermore, the update of beliefs is straightforward: Let γ denote the critical foreign type
which is indiﬀerent between entry and no entry into the domestic market. If the domestic
7ﬁrm believes that only the (productive) types will enter for which c2 ≤ γ, it follows that
F2(c2) = c2/γ. Since the most intense price competition will occur if the foreign can enter
easily, we also assume the following:
Assumption 2 The investment cost the foreign ﬁrm has to pay for entering the market
is very small, i.e. ǫ ≃ 0.
Both assumptions enable us to determine the optimal pricing behavior for the laissez-
faire case without policy intervention:
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and without policy intervention, F2(c2) equals
1/(1 − t) and ﬁrm 2 enters if c2 ≤ 1 − t. Furthermore, in case of entry, the equilibrium
pricing functions are given by:
p1(c1) = 1 −
 
1 + 2(1 − c1)2K1 − 1
2(1 − c1)K1
(5)
p2(c2) = 1 −
 
1 + 2(1 − [c2 + t])2K2 − 1







(1 − t)2 ≥ 0 and K2 = −K1 ≤ 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Note that our solution includes the special case of symmetry when t = 0. In this case,








Let us return to the case of a strictly positive trade cost. Figure 1 depicts an example
of the pricing functions derived above (where we have chosen t to equal 0.2). Note that
the pricing strategy of the foreign ﬁrm is depicted as a function of total cost, c2 + t, and
is represented by the lower of the two curves, the one that starts at t = 0.2. Now consider
the following notion of aggressiveness: A ﬁrm’s pricing strategy is more aggressive than
that of its rival if it has the larger overall cost (which includes t for the foreign ﬁrm) when
charging the same price. Comparing the two ﬁrms’ strategies, there is a clear result:








Figure 1: Equilibrium price functions for t = 0.2.
Lemma 2 The foreign ﬁrm prices more aggressively than the domestic ﬁrm.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
The intuitive reason for this result is that the foreign ﬁrm wants to make up for its
inherent cost disadvantage (caused by the trade cost t) in order to increase its probability
of winning.
One important consequence of the foreign ﬁrm’s aggressive pricing behavior is the
possibility that it oﬀers the lower price even though it has the higher overall cost. Hence
our framework has the potential to generate an ineﬃcient allocation of resources. Note
that it is not always the case that the allocation is ineﬃcient when the foreign ﬁrm oﬀers
the lower price. The ineﬃciency only arises when the foreign ﬁrm oﬀers the lower price and
has the higher cost. Formally, the outcome is ineﬃcient whenever p2 < p1 and c2 + t > c1.
While this model admits the possibility of an ineﬃcient outcome it is natural to ask












Not surprisingly the likelihood of an ineﬃcient outcome is a function of the size of the trade

















Figure 2: Probability and Conditional Expected Loss under Laissez-faire




t2 − 4t + 2
2(t2 − 4t + 4)
(8)
This derivative is positive for low trade costs but becomes negative for higher t. The result-
ing non-monotonicity of the probability of ineﬃciency is displayed in Figure 2. Figure 2 also
shows the expected loss, conditional upon ineﬃcient entry, which can rise up to signiﬁcant
15% of the ex ante surplus.
Note that this also has the interesting interpretation that the phenomena of ineﬃciency
in our model is non-monotonic. That is, if trade costs are low, then a mis-allocation of
resources is unlikely to occur because the ineﬃciency disappears as t goes to zero. Similarly,
if trade costs are very high, then ineﬃciency is also unlikely to occur because the foreign
ﬁrm is most likely not competitive. However, as trade costs start to fall, the likelihood of
an ineﬃcient outcome increases. Regardless of the source of the trade costs (i.e. transport
costs or artiﬁcial trade barriers), the model poses a challenge for the policy maker: since
the allocation of resources can be ineﬃcient, is it possible to use government policy to
improve on the market outcome? Since the market outcome is not always ineﬃcient, the
policy will necessarily be contingent.
103 Globally Optimal Policy
Start by considering a globally eﬃcient policy. Such a policy has the objective of avoiding
the ineﬃciency and ensuring that the lower cost ﬁrm serves the market. We study this
case ﬁrst because it provides a useful benchmark. The global planner, however, cannot
directly observe the costs of the ﬁrms which are private information. She can only observe
the prices that they charge.
A characteristic of the pricing functions that we derived in the previous section is
that they are strictly monotone and therefore invertible. Consequently, a global planner
can deduce from the announced prices what each ﬁrm’s costs are, at least in a scenario
without intervention. Clearly, allowing the government to intervene changes the nature
of the interaction, and may lead to pricing functions that are no longer monotone. This
section therefore has two goals: to determine how the equilibrium pricing functions are
altered if the global planner announces the objective of allocating production to the lowest
cost ﬁrm. And second, to check whether the new pricing functions are indeed monotone,
so that the policy-maker can deduce the information that is required to implement the
policy.
Start by assuming that an equilibrium with strictly monotone pricing functions exists
if the global planner announces her intention to intervene in order to allocate production
to the lower cost ﬁrm. Note that the ineﬃciency in the (baseline) model always involved
the foreign ﬁrm because the domestic ﬁrm never oﬀered the lower price when it has the
higher cost. This is not necessarily true anymore with policy intervention. Note further
that we do not need monotonicity across the entire range. In particular, for c1 ∈ [0,t], a
single domestic price is suﬃcient as the domestic ﬁrm has always lower cost in this range.
If one ﬁrm has the higher cost (inclusive of trade costs in case of the foreign ﬁrm) but
the lower price, the policymaker intervenes and allows the ﬁrm’s competitor to serve the
market at price
˜ pi = αci + (1 − α)pi, (9)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We choose this linear combination in order to allow for a wide range of
possibilities: at one extreme, if α is chosen to be one, the government forces the ﬁrm that
11is awarded the market to sell at cost, while for α = 0 the government allows the ﬁrm to
charge its original higher bid price. Clearly, the choice of α will inﬂuence the respective
pricing behavior. In practice, forcing the ﬁrm, say the domestic ﬁrm, to sell at a certain
price can be achieved by setting (ex post) the appropriate tariﬀ. For example, imposing
a tariﬀ of τ on the lower price foreign ﬁrm translates into allowing the domestic ﬁrm to
charge ˜ p1 = p2 + τ.
Operating in an environment where trade policy is made contingent on the ranking of
both prices and costs complicates the form of the expected proﬁt functions. Now, not only
are proﬁts a function of prices (as was the case in 1), but also of contingent policy. To
derive the proﬁt of each ﬁrm under this regime requires working through the implications
of choosing a price, conditional on the ﬁrm’s own costs, the conjecture about the other
ﬁrms pricing function and also the potential for policy intervention.
Let us start from the fact that each ﬁrm knows its own cost ci and treats the other
ﬁrm’s cost cj as a random variable with cumulative distribution function Fj. In this case,
two important reference points on the support of Fj are the own cost ci, as this is the
threshold that prompts the global policymaker to act (i.e. if ci ≤ cj the policy maker will
award the market to ﬁrm i if it does not have the lower price), and second, just as before,
the cost that its own price implies on part of the other ﬁrm using the competitor’s inverse
bid function, i.e. φj(pi), as this is the threshold for winning the market outright without
intervention.
To be more precise, assume ﬁrst that one ﬁrm, say the domestic ﬁrm, follows an aggres-
sive pricing policy and sets a low price such that φ2(p1)+t < c1 (i.e. if the foreign ﬁrm set
the price p1 it would be associated with a cost draw of c2 = φ2(p1), which implies a total
cost less than that of the domestic ﬁrm). In other words, if both ﬁrms charged the same
price, it would turn out that the foreign ﬁrm has the lower overall cost, and this would
prompt a policy intervention. Hence, in case of an aggressive pricing strategy, the domestic
ﬁrm can win only if it has the lower cost, and this happens with probability 1−F2(c1−t).11
Now suppose that the domestic ﬁrm prices less aggressively such that φ2(p1)+t > c1. In
11Similarly, if the foreign ﬁrm charges a low price such that φ1(p2) < c2 +t, it will win only if it has the
lower overall cost, that is, if c2 + t < c1 which happens with probability 1 − F1(c2 + t).
12that case, it will win outright if it charges the lower price which happens with probability
[1 − F2(φ2(p1)]. In addition, if c2 + t ∈ [c1,φ2(p1)], the competitor wins, but is overruled
by the global policy maker who will give the market to the domestic ﬁrm at price ˜ p1. This
will happen with probability [F2(φ2(p1)) − F2(c1 − t)].12
Given own costs, conjectures about the rival’s pricing strategy and the form of contin-
gent protection, we can now determine the proﬁt functions of both ﬁrms. The domestic
ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts are equal to
π1 =

   
   
[1 − F2(c1 − t)](p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t ≤ c1, (10a)
[1 − F2(φ2(p1))](p1 − c1) +
[F2(φ2(p1)) − F2(c1 − t)](˜ p1 − c1)
if φ2(p1) + t > c1 (10b)
and the foreign ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts are equal to
π2 =

   
   
[1 − F1(c2 − t)](p2 − c2 − t) if φ1(p2) ≤ c2 + t, (11a)
[1 − F1(φ1(p2))](p2 − c2 − t)
+[F1(φ1(p2)) − F1(c2 + t)](˜ p2 − c2 − t)
if φ1(p2) > c2 + t, (11b)
where ˜ p1, ˜ p2 are determined according to (9).
Intuitively, if a ﬁrm prices aggressively it will win outright whenever it has the lower
cost. On the other hand, for pi above a threshold, the probability of winning outright
decreases in its own price, whereas the probability of winning due to policy intervention
depends positively on the price, but the margin might be lower in that case, depending on
the policy rule ˜ p.
Given the expected proﬁt it is now possible to determine the optimal pricing strategies.
Diﬀerentiating equations (10a) and (10b) with respect to p1 yields respectively (similar
12Similarly, if the foreign ﬁrm prices less aggressively such that φ1(p2) > c2 + t, it wins straightaway
with probability [1 − F1(φ1(p2)] and will win the market for the price ˜ p2 due to policy intervention with
probability [F1(φ1(p2)) − F1(c2 + t)].





   
   
[1 − F2(c1 − t)] if φ2(p1) + t ≤ c1, (12a)




2(p1 − ˜ p1)
+(1 − α)(F2(φ2(p1)) − F2(c1 − t)).
if φ2(p1) + t > c1 (12b)
It is in general not clear whether it is (12a) or (12b) that determines the best pricing
policy. Expression (12a) shows that the marginal proﬁt is constant for φ2(p1) ≤ c2+t, and
hence expected proﬁts increase until φ1(p2) = c2 + t. At φ2(p1) = c2 + t, the proﬁt curve
has a downward kink, but it is not clear a priori whether (12b) is positive or negative at
this point. If it is positive, proﬁts increase further, and we ﬁnd the optimal price by setting
(12b) equal to zero. If not, φ1(p2) = c2 + t gives the maximum as proﬁts decline beyond
that point.
To gain insight into the role of contingent protection in determining the optimal pricing
strategy, consider two extreme cases: Start with the situation where α = 1, which implies
˜ p1 = c1. Note that this implies that the expression in 12b is equal to
∂π1
∂p1





At the other extreme, when α = 0, the regulating authority allows the eﬃcient ﬁrm to




= 1 − F2(c1 − t) ∀p1. (13)
This induces each ﬁrm to charge the maximum price of one because it knows that the chance
of winning only depends on the cost realization. In this case, the price solely determines
the proﬁt margin if the ﬁrm happens to have the lower cost. However, all types choose this
pricing policy, and hence the regulating authority cannot learn anything about the ﬁrm’s
type. Except for α = 0, we have the following clear result:
Proposition 1 If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and the government intervenes according to
(9) with α ∈ (0,1] in case of ineﬃciency, F2(c2) = 1/(1 − t), that is, ﬁrm 2 enters if
14c2 ≤ 1 − t. In case of entry, the equilibrium pricing functions are given by
p1(c1) =

   
   
1 + αt
1 + α
if c1 ∈ [0,t],
1 + αc1
1 + α
if c1 ∈ [t,1],
p2(c2) =
1 + α(c2 + t)
1 + α
(14)
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 shows that both ﬁrms use symmetric pricing functions across the common
range of overall costs. Appendix A.2 demonstrates that neither ﬁrm charges a price such
that it will win only because it has a lower cost, instead both ﬁrms want to win straightaway.
While it may be tempting to think that an equilibrium with symmetric pricing functions
involves both ﬁrms charging lower prices, we see that this is incorrect in general. For
example, the pricing functions are equal to p1 = (1 + c1)/2 and p2 = (1 + c2 + t)/2 for
the common support of overall costs if α = 1. Furthermore, both (1 + αc1)/(1 + α) and
(1 + α(c2 + t))/(1 + α) increase with α. The reason for this is that a high α gives more
weight on the marginal cost and less weight on the posted price for the case of intervention
(see (9)). It therefore becomes less attractive to win because of intervention so that the
posted prices go up as to compensate for the decrease in expected proﬁt after potential
intervention.
These pricing functions allow us to answer the two questions posed at the beginning of
the section. When a global contingent trade policy is announced, the pricing functions are
symmetric over the range of common costs. This diﬀers substantially from the outcome un-
der laissez-faire where the foreign ﬁrm would systematically price lower than the domestic
ﬁrm, given the same cost draw. Given that the two ﬁrms follow the same pricing policy over
the set of common costs, ineﬃciency is no longer an equilibrium outcome. Consequently,
the policy is eﬀective in achieving its objective of a ﬁrst best outcome. As for the question
whether the policymaker can still infer the costs, note that the above pricing functions
are strictly increasing where the supports overlap, and the domestic one is constant at the
lower end. That is, the policymaker can infer costs and hence the policy is feasible.
15A further observation is that while global welfare is maximized by this policy, there are
signiﬁcant distributional implications that might undermine its adoption. In particular,
the home country will have a lower expected welfare in some cases. For example, as α → 0,
both ﬁrms employ very ﬂat pricing functions that approach 1. In this case, whenever the
foreign ﬁrm has lower costs, the home country receives approximately zero welfare. As
t → 0, this occurs approximately half of the time. Under laissez-faire the domestic country
gets positive consumer surplus for almost all cost draws and half of the time also gains
domestic proﬁts. Consequently, the home country is not always better oﬀ under a global
contingent trade policy. In some sense the global policy acts as a “collusion device”.
4 Nationally Optimal Policy
The potential for adverse distributional consequences associated with the implementation
of a globally eﬃcient regime suggests that contingent trade policy is more likely to be
implemented at a national level, as is the case for example with antidumping policy. If
contingent trade policy is left to national governments to design and administer, however,
it will be conducted with the objective of maximizing national welfare, not global welfare.
In contrast to the globally optimal policy, national governments do not only seek to cor-
rect the potential ineﬃciency, they also pursue rent shifting motives because they value
the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt but not the foreign competitor’s. Consequently, they intervene
earlier and the foreign ﬁrm will be allowed to serve the domestic market only if its price
is below the domestic ﬁrm’s cost, because only in that case does the gain to domestic
consumers dominate the proﬁt loss of the domestic ﬁrm. If the foreign price lies between
the domestic cost and the domestic price, on the other hand, then a prohibitive import
tariﬀ is imposed, and the domestic ﬁrm is allowed to set a price equal to (9). The objective
of the domestic government to maximize national welfare suggests that there is likely to
be a divergence from the eﬃcient outcomes of the globally optimal benchmark. The in-
teresting question then is whether or not the domestic policy mitigates or exaggerates the
ineﬃciencies associated with market failure.
To answer this question we must, once again, address the same two issues as in the
16previous section: How does the announcement of such a policy inﬂuence the equilibrium
pricing functions? And can the policy be successfully implemented? As before, we start
by assuming that the pricing functions are monotonically increasing so that observing the
bids allows the government to infer the respective costs.13
Provided that the foreign ﬁrm only gets to serve the market if its price is below the
domestic ﬁrm’s cost, the foreign ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt takes the following simple form:
π2(p2,c2) = [1 − F1(p2)](p2 − c2 − t) (15)
Note that the foreign ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt is independent of p1, and therefore independent
of the domestic ﬁrm’s pricing behavior. Therefore the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization
can be solved independently of the domestic ﬁrm’s pricing behavior.
Lemma 3 If a foreign ﬁrm for which c2 ∈ [0,1 − t] enters and a national government
intervenes according to (9) as to maximize domestic welfare, the foreign ﬁrm’s pricing and
inverse pricing functions are respectively given by
p2(c2) =
1 + c2 + t
2
and φ2(p2) + t = 2p2 − 1. (16)
Proof: For an interior solution, the ﬁrst order condition is given by
∂π2
∂p2
= [1 − F1(p2)] − F
′
1(p2)(p2 − φ2(p2) − t) = 0 (17)
which implies the following inverse bid function




Assumption 1 implies (16).
13Note that in this case we will only need this assumption for the domestic pricing function since the
foreign price and not cost turns out to be the conditioning variable.
17We now turn attention to the domestic ﬁrm’s behavior. Given the foreign ﬁrm’s strategy,
the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt function takes the following form:
π1 =

   
   
p1 − c1 if p1 ≤ (1 + t)/2, (19a)
[1 − F2(φ2(p1))](p1 − c1) +
[F2(φ2(p1)) − F2(φ2(c1))](˜ p1 − c1)
otherwise (19b)
where ˜ p1 (see (9)) is the price that the government allows the domestic company to charge
in case of policy intervention, as before. As long as the domestic ﬁrm charges a price below
the lowest foreign price, that is p1 ≤ p2(c2 = 0) = (1 + t)/2, it wins the market for sure,
which leads to proﬁts of p1 − c1. If the domestic price lies above the threshold, there is
a probability that it wins the market outright, represented by the ﬁrst term of (19b), or
it may win due to national policy intervention, which is reﬂected by the second term of
(19b). We now derive the domestic ﬁrm’s optimal pricing strategy resulting from the above
proﬁt function.
Proposition 2 If the national government maximizes national welfare and intervenes ac-









a foreign ﬁrm for which c2 ∈ [0,1 − t] enters and the domestic ﬁrm’s pricing function is
given by




Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Note that there is a tighter restriction on α compared to the globally optimal policy.
First, given foreign pricing behavior, the domestic ﬁrm can win for sure if it charges
(1 + t)/2. This is unproﬁtable only if the price ˜ p1 imposed by the authority is not too
close to the cost but leaves a substantially large proﬁt. This is the reason for the upper
bound on α. Second, if α were small, the domestic ﬁrm would receive a proﬁt close to its
posted price in case of intervention. Since the domestic ﬁrm loses only if its price is above
18its rival’s cost, it would go for the maximum (unity) price for a low α, and not only if
α = 0 as in the case of globally optimal policies. This is the reason for the lower bound on
α.















Figure 3: Comparison of Probabilities and Expected Losses
What are the consequences of a national contingent trade policy? Given the focus on
allocative eﬃciency, this will be employed as the appropriate benchmark. In the case of the
nationally eﬃcient policy, there is again the possibility of ineﬃciency, that is, the higher
cost ﬁrm ends serving the market. However, it can never be the case that the higher cost
foreign ﬁrm serves the market. Instead the national policy favors the domestic ﬁrm which
might end up serving the market despite having the higher cost. That is, the market failure
that we identiﬁed in the laissez-faire scenario is now replaced by a (globally) ineﬃcient
allocation brought about by the government, only that the ineﬃciency now goes in the
opposite direction.
To gain some idea of the likelihood of this scenario, Appendix A.3 shows that the
probability of an ineﬃcient outcome is given by (1 − t)2/4. This enables us to compare
the probabilities of the ineﬃcient outcomes in the laissez-faire equilibrium (see the dashed
lines in Figure 3’s left panel) and for the nationally optimal policies (see the solid lines in
Figure 3’s left panel) respectively. In the right panel, Λ is the diﬀerence in the unconditional
expected loss between the nationally optimal policies and the laissez-faire equilibrium. As
is evident, there is not an unambiguous ranking of these policies.
19In contrast to the laissez-faire outcome, the likelihood of the domestic policy inducing
an ineﬃcient allocation is monotonic — the ineﬃciency probability being much larger
(lower) for low (high) levels of t. The reason is that the nationally optimal policy will
call for intervention also when trade costs are low provided the foreign price (not foreign
overall cost) exceeds the domestic cost. In this case, intervention happens mostly for rent
shifting motives, as the likelihood of an allocative ineﬃciency under laissez faire is low.
For higher trade costs, on the other hand, the foreign ﬁrm charges a higher price, and
thus its probability of winning is low. The national government thus is rarely prompted to
intervene. This is in contrast to the laissez-faire regime in which the foreign ﬁrm prices more
aggressively. Therefore, the nationally optimal policy has a lower ineﬃciency probability
for high trade costs.
Comparison to the laissez-faire case reveals that the nationally conducted contingent
trade policy dominates for high trade costs, while laissez-faire is welfare superior (in ex-
pectation) for lower trade costs. Abstracting from other aspects, one could thus argue that
nationally conducted antidumping policy, to take one example, might have been a good
idea when trade costs were high. Once trade costs decrease with globalization, however,
there comes a point when not allowing such nationally conducted policies would actually
be preferable.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has developed an eﬃciency theory of contingent trade policies. We show that
there is a case for policy intervention if ﬁrms compete by prices under incomplete informa-
tion. The reason is that the foreign ﬁrm is more aggressive without intervention. In case of
a globally optimal policy, ineﬃciency will not occur because both ﬁrms employ the same
pricing strategy across the common range of overall costs. Thus, the policy does not have
to be applied but its announcement to apply it in the relevant cases is already successful. In
case of a nationally optimal policy, only the domestic ﬁrm can be the source of ineﬃciency,
and ineﬃciency is likely to occur for low trade costs compared to the laissez-faire. This
observation strengthens the need for global policy coordination of contingent trade policies
20if markets become more integrated.
Global policy coordination, however, is not yet built into multilateral trade policies.
Until now, trade policy is a national matter except for countries within the European
Union. The need for global policy coordination with ongoing integration raises the question
whether the existing trade agreements should continue to allow contingent trade policies in
the ﬁrst place. Furthermore, should future trade agreements give the option of interventions
to supranational authorities, and not to individual countries? Given the potential distri-
butional consequences which may arise if contingent trade policies act only on allocational
eﬃciency, the establishment of such an authority seems unlikely.
This leaves us with the question whether the recent policy options, anti-dumping, safe-
guards and countervailing duties, become more and more vulnerable to policy interventions
in the national interest of countries. Our paper has stressed that the likelihood of ineﬃcien-
cies when these policies are carried out in the national interest increases with an ongoing
integration. This leads us to the conclusion that the conditions under which countries are
allowed to use these instruments should become rather more restrictive than be relaxed.
Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium pricing strategies without policy intervention
In case of entry, let γ,γ ∈ [0,1 − t] denotes the critical foreign type which is indiﬀerent
between entry and no entry. We will determine γ below. Given that the domestic ﬁrm
knows the size of ǫ and an observe this investment, it will update its beliefs if it observes
entry such that the foreign types which enter will be uniformly distributed between 0 and







(p1 − c1), (A.1)
π2(p2;c2) = (1 − φ1(p2))(p2 − c2 − t).
First, let us establish that both ﬁrms will employ a price strategy such that the optimal
price functions have a common upper and lower bound for those prices by which each ﬁrm
is able to win demand. Let the lower (upper) bound be denoted by p(p). If pi = p, ﬁrm
i will win with certainty, so there is no reason to undercut this price. This conﬁrms the
21common lower price bound, and hence φ1(0) = φ2(0) = p. Suppose that the ﬁrst-order
conditions (3) are fulﬁlled for all pi ∈ [p,p]. We will now establish that
p =




1 + t + γ
2
, φ2(p) = γ
φ1(p1) = c1, ∀p1 ∈ [p,1]
are part of the equilibrium pricing strategies. Note that (A.2) speciﬁes that the domestic
ﬁrm charges its cost for all prices above p; in these cases, the domestic ﬁrm cannot win the
market and will be beaten by the foreign ﬁrm with probability one. As we have assumed
that the ﬁrst-order conditions hold up to p, we have to prove that no ﬁrm is better oﬀ
by charging a higher price. As for the domestic ﬁrm, π1(p;p) = 0 because it will win with
zero probability. A higher price leads also to zero proﬁts as it does not change the zero win
probability; hence, the domestic ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate from this strategy. The
foreign ﬁrm is supposed to charge p for c2 = γ. Given that the domestic ﬁrm charges its
cost for all prices above p, the foreign ﬁrm proﬁt is equal to
π2(p;γ) = (1 − p)(p − γ − t) =
(1 − t − γ)2
4
(A.3)
if it follows the prescribed strategy and
π2(p2 > p;γ) = (1 − p2)(p2 − γ − t)
if it charges a higher price. Maximizing π2(p2 > p;γ) over p2 leads to an optimal p2 = p,
and hence also the foreign ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate.
For all p1,p2 ∈ [p,p], the ﬁrst-order conditions for (A.1) are
γ − φ2(p1) − φ
′
2(p1)(p1 − c1) = 0,
1 − φ1(p2) − φ
′
1(p2)(p2 − c2 − t) = 0.
Note that each ﬁrst-order condition depends on both inverse price functions. We now
follow a solution concept similar to Krishna (2002) as to determine the boundary conditions
and to simplify the diﬀerential equations. In equilibrium, ci = φi(pi), and using p as the
argument in the inverse price functions allows us to rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition as
(φ
′
1(p) − 1)(p − φ2(p) − t) = 1 − φ1(p) − p + φ2(p) + t,
(φ
′




(p − φ1(p))(p − φ2(p) − t) = 1 + t + γ − 2p, (A.4)
and integration implies
(p − φ1(p))(p − φ2(p) − t) = p
2 − (1 + t + γ)p + K, (A.5)
where K denotes the integration constant. We can determine K by using the upper
boundary condition. For p = p, the LHS of (A.5) is zero and we ﬁnd that
K =
(1 + t + γ)2
4
,
so that (A.5) reads
(p − φ1(p))(p − φ2(p) − t) = p
2 − (1 + t + γ)p +
(1 + t + γ)2
4
(A.6)
in equilibrium. Furthermore, φ1(0) = φ2(0) = p so that
p(p − t) = p
2 − (1 + t + γ)p +




(1 + t + γ)2
4(1 + γ)
. (A.7)
We can use (A.6) as to rewrite the ﬁrst-order conditions such that each depends on a
single inverse price function only:
γ − φ2(p) = φ
′
2(p)
p2 − (1 + t + γ)p +
(1+t+γ)2
4
p − φ2(p) − t
= 0, (A.8)
1 − φ1(p) = φ
′
1(p)





Eqs. (A.2), (A.7) and (A.8) completely describe the equilibrium behavior of both ﬁrms
in terms of their inverse price functions.14 Hence, they represent the solution to Stage II
14It is possible to derive explicit solutions for the inverse price functions. These functions, however,
cannot be inverted as to solve for the price functions. The results are available upon request.
23of our game, given that no intervention will occur. As for stage I, eq. (A.3) allows us to
determine the critical type γ which will be indiﬀerent between entry and no entry. This
type’s expected proﬁt must be equal to the investment ǫ such that
γ = 1 − t − 2
√
ǫ.
An interior solution requires that 2
√
ǫ < 1 − t. More importantly, as we deal with
markets to which entry is easy, γ ≃ 1 − t for a ǫ suﬃciently close to zero. For γ ≃ 1 − t,
(A.8) simpliﬁes to




p − φ2(p) − t
, (A.9)






Because prices must not fall short of overall costs, φ′
1,φ′
2 > 0, and hence the solutions
to (A.9) satisfy that the (inverse) price functions increase with the costs (prices). Solving
these equations gives the inverse price functions
φ1(p) = 1 −
2(1 − p)
1 − 2(1 − p)2K1
(A.10)
φ2(p) = 1 −
2(1 − p)
1 − 2(1 − p)2K2
− t, (A.11)
where the Ki’s are the constants of integration. Note that the domestic ﬁrm’s price
policy will no longer include a range of prices in which it will charge its cost (and win with
zero probability) because
p = 1 and p =
1
2 − t





(1 − t)2 ≥ 0 and K2 = −K1 ≤ 0.
Plugging K1 and K2 back into (A.10) and solving for p yields (5).
To determine the probability that an ineﬃcient outcome occurs, contingent upon entry
of the foreign ﬁrm, we deﬁne the borderline ˜ c2(c1) between the ineﬃcient and the eﬃcient
24set of cost draws at which the resulting prices are equal. Setting p1 and p2 in (5) equal to
each other gives
˜ c2(c1) = 1 −
1 − c1  












1 − c1  











1 − (2 − t) t (2 − c1) c1
(1 − t)
2 ≥ 1
⇔ 1 − (2 − t)t(2 − c1)c1 ≥ (1 − t)
2. (A.13)
Note that the LHS decreases with c1 and is thus at least equal to 1−2t+t2 = (1−t)2
or larger which completes the proof for Lemma 2.







Figure 4: Ineﬃciency in the laissez-faire equilibrium
The probability of ineﬃciency can be best derived from two graphs in the c2−c1−space.
Figure 4 shows equation (A.12) for t = 0.2 as the solid line. The broken line is the eﬃciency
border c2 = c1 − t where both ﬁrms are equally eﬃcient. For c1 < t, the domestic ﬁrm is
25the eﬃcient one in any case. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, the foreign ﬁrm wins (loses) if
˜ c2 < (>)c1, and the domestic ﬁrm should win from a global perspective if c2 > c1 −t. The
area between the two lines represents the ineﬃciency. Note that the size of the rectangle is
1 − t due to the upper bound for c2. The probability of ineﬃciency can thus be computed
as the area below the solid line minus the area below the broken line, corrected by the
factor 1/(1 − t):
1
1 − t

















A.2 Globally optimal contingent trade policies
Our proof proceeds in two steps. First, we assume that all foreign ﬁrm for which c2 ∈
[0,1 − t] will enter. Second, we will show that no foreign ﬁrm for which c2 ∈ [1 − t,1] can
be better oﬀ by entering, and no foreign ﬁrm for which c2 ∈ [0,1 − t] can be better oﬀ by
not entering. In the main text, we have discussed the ﬁrst derivative of the domestic ﬁrm




= [1 − F1(c2 + t)] > 0
if φ1(p2) ≤ c2 + t, (A.15)
∂π2
∂p2




1(p2 − ˜ p2) + (1 − α)(F1(φ1(p2)) − F1(c2 + t))
if φ1(p2) > c1 + t. (A.16)
Assume that both (12a) and (A.15) are not binding. Given Assumption 1, we ﬁnd for
our candidate pricing functions (14) that proﬁts can be written as
π1 =
2(1 + αc1) − (1 + α)p1
1 − t
,
π2 = (p2 − c2 − t)(2 − (1 − α)(c2 + t) − (1 + α)p2) (A.17)
26if the constraints imposed by (12a) and (A.15) do not bind. In (A.17), we assume for the
domestic (foreign) proﬁt that the domestic (foreign) ﬁrm expects the foreign (domestic)
ﬁrm to charge a price according to (14). Maximization of these proﬁts w.r.t. p1 and p2
reproduces (14). Furthermore,
φ2(p1) = c1 ⇔ p1 =






φ1(p2) = c2 ⇔ p2 =
1 + α(c2 + t)
1 + α
=
1 + α(c2 + t)
1 + α
,
so that both (12a) and (A.15) are not binding (or just not binding for the foreign
ﬁrm). Hence, our candidate pricing functions (14) are mutually consistent as they set both
(12b) and (A.16) equal to zero for the common range of overall costs. Furthermore, they
are increasing in costs. Note, however, that the domestic ﬁrm will win with certainty if
c1 ∈ [0,t]. Hence, the domestic ﬁrm will not lower its price beyond p1(c1 = t) as it cannot
increase its win probability any further. This proves that the pricing function are optimal
if all foreign ﬁrm for which c2 ∈ [0,1 − t] will enter, and all other ﬁrms will stay away.
Now note that the any foreign ﬁrm for which c2 ∈ [1 − t,1] cannot make any proﬁt by
entering as its break even price is unity. Furthermore, no ﬁrm for c2 ∈ [0,1 − t] cannot
be better oﬀ by not entering as there is a positive probability that it will win the market.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
A.3 Nationally optimal contingent trade policies
Below the lowest price of the foreign ﬁrm, the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is strictly
increasing in p1. This implies that the domestic ﬁrm will never set a price below (1 + t)/2
but instead charge (1 + t)/2 which leads to proﬁts of ˆ π1 = (1 + t)/2 − c1.
Above the threshold, the ﬁrst order condition for (19b) leads to (20). Note that this
function is monotonically increasing as long as α > 1/2. For α = 1/2 the domestic ﬁrm
charges a price of one, independent of its cost draw. For a lower α, that is, when the govern-
ment allows the domestic ﬁrm to charge a relatively high price in case of intervention, the
ﬁrst order condition would imply a decreasing price above unity, but given our assumption
that the willingness to pay is bounded at one, it charges a price of one for all α ≤ 1/2.
For α > 1/2 we need to check that the proﬁt resulting from the above pricing rule
exceeds the proﬁt ˆ π1 that the ﬁrm would obtain by charging the lowest price of the foreign










27This condition is satisﬁed for all cost draws c1 ∈ [0,1] as long as α ≤ 1/(1+t). As in the
case of globally optimal policies, any foreign ﬁrm for which c2 ∈ [1−t,1] cannot make any
proﬁt by entering as its break even price is unity. Furthermore, no ﬁrm for c2 ∈ [0,1 − t]
cannot be better oﬀ by not entering as there is a positive probability that it will win the
market. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.







Figure 5: Ineﬃciency for nationally optimal policies
As for the ineﬃciency probability, we proceed similarly as in Appendix A.1. Figure 5
also shows the eﬃciency border as a broken line for t = 0.2. However, now the domestic
ﬁrm is the source of potential ineﬃciency. Setting (16) and (20) equal to each other, we
get a critical ˆ c2 = 2c1 − (1 + t) which is given by the solid line. This line gives the costs
for which both ﬁrms charge the same prices ,and hence the domestic ﬁrm wins if c2 is
larger. This function is only deﬁned for c1 ∈ [(1 + t)/2,1]. The probability of ineﬃciency
is given by the area below the broken line minus the area below the solid line, corrected
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